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# THE CHRISTIAN CITIZEN IN A CHANGING WORLD

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### *Foreword*

This paper is written by a layman who has been active in the field of international affairs. It is primarily an action paper, not a theological paper. It accepts, explicitly or implicitly, basic Christian beliefs and suggests how, in the actual situation, they may impose on Christian citizens a duty of practical conduct.

There is no thought that the Church should endorse the conclusions reached or the lines of action suggested. The writer is, indeed, one who believes that the Church ought not to make authoritative pronouncements with respect to detailed action in political, economic or social fields. Practical political action is not often a subject for authoritative moral judgments of universal scope. Those who act in the political field must deal with the possible, not with the ideal; they must try to get the relatively good, the lesser evil; they cannot, without frustration, reject whatever is not wholly good; they cannot be satisfied with proclaimed ends, but must deal with actual means. Those necessities prevail conspicuously in the international field where tradition, national interest and group loyalty have accumulated to an unusual degree. They place limits on what is practically possible; they introduce error into every human judgment; they increase the ever-present risk that men will see as "right" that which is self-serving.

Facts such as those mentioned require that the churches should exercise great caution in dealing with international political matters. They should not seem to put the seal of God's approval upon that which, at best, may be expedient, but which cannot wholly reflect God's will.

It does not, however, follow that Christian faith and Christian political action are unrelated. All citizens have to act in relation to political matters—inaction being only a form of action, a clearing of the way for others who do act. Also, Christian citizens, when they act, will try to be guided by Christian insight and Christian inspiration. Political institutions molded by those who take a Christian view of the nature of man will be different from those molded by atheists. What the churches elect to say will have political consequences. What they elect to keep silent about will also have political consequences. So the churches, too, have a relationship to practical politics that is inescapable.

Since that is so, it seems that the churches ought to know what are the problems which Christian citizens face. "Thy word is a lamp unto my feet and a light unto my path". But the churches cannot throw light of the Word upon the Christians' paths unless they know where those paths lie and what are the obstacles that need to be illumined lest the Christian pilgrim stumble and fall. It is useful, no doubt, for Christian citizens to be inspired by the vision of a distant, heavenly scene. But also it is useful to have light upon the way.

Obviously, Christian citizens throughout the world do not all face identical problems or have identical duties. No single presentation can adequately inform the churches. There are, in the world, many paths for Christians, all leading toward a central point, the doing of God's will on earth. Some paths lead from the East, some from the West, some from the North, some from the South. Each of these paths has obstacles of its own. In turn, these obstacles constantly shift. What is described now may be irrelevant by tomorrow. Despite the fact that the scene is world-wide and shifting, the churches should seek to keep informed. Otherwise, they cannot keep each way illuminated with shafts of the divine light.

This paper seeks to show, in relation to international affairs, what is the political path which some Christians have to tread, what they see as the obstacles ahead, and how they think they can, perhaps, overcome these obstacles and wrest the initiative from forces of evil, ignorance and despair which exist in every land and which seem to be conspiring to overwhelm mankind with awful disaster.

The writer recognizes, quite frankly, that the path he describes is a path which leads from the West. He knows full well that that way differs from other ways. These, too, should be known, for the Church concedes no priority or privilege to any nation, race or class.

As the churches come to know better the practical problems which Christian citizens have to face and the lines of action in which they may become engaged, the churches in turn will be better able to minister to the actual needs. They will be better able to show, to each and to all, that Christ is indeed the Way, the Truth and the Life. As Christ is so revealed, He will draw all men unto Him, and that supreme loyalty will provide the unifying force which otherwise men seek in vain.

# THE CHRISTIAN CITIZEN IN A CHANGING WORLD

## 1.

### THE INEVITABILITY OF CHANGE.

The basic political and social fact that citizens must face up to is the fact of change. Life and change are inseparable. Human beings constantly change. So, too, do human societies. There are always some who unthinkingly wish that they could stop change and freeze a moment into eternity. That cannot be and, indeed, we should not want it to be. If it happened, it would mean an end and the replacement of life with death.

Christians do not regret the inevitability of change. Rather, they see in it a cause for rejoicing. Some religions see man as bound to a wheel which turns and on the turning of which he can exert no influence. As a result of that assumption it follows, for them, that the ideal mental state is one of indifference and renunciation of hopes and efforts which can end only in frustration. The Christian believes that he can do something about change to determine its character and, accordingly, he looks upon the inevitability of change as something that provides opportunity. That opportunity has a dual aspect. Outwardly, there is the opportunity to make the world more nearly one in which God's will is done on earth as it is in heaven. Inwardly, there is the opportunity for personal growth and development which comes out of grappling with situations and trying to mold them.

When there is change, something that *is* disappears and something that *was not* appears. Also, whenever there is change there is a means, a force, that brings change to pass. The Christian seeks the disappearance of that which he deems imperfect. But the disappearance of something imperfect is not, of itself, sufficient to make change good. If that were so, all change, by whatever means, would be good, for everything is to some extent imperfect and there cannot be change without the disappearance of some imperfection. The Christian tries to

appraise change not merely in terms of what disappears, but also in terms of what replaces that which disappears. This appraisal involves an appraisal of means as well as ends, for the means by which change is accomplished makes an indelible impression upon the result and becomes, indeed, a part of the result.

For Christians, the great social task is to deal with the forces that make *some* change imperative so that (a) these forces will make their principal impact on what can be and will be replaced by something better; (b) the forces for change will leave relatively immune what at the moment cannot be replaced by something better; and (c) the forces for change will not themselves be evil and un-Christian in character.

## 2.

### THERE IS NEED THAT CHANGE BE INSTITUTIONALIZED.

Political leaders who have, or want, power, usually talk much alike as to the social ends they seek. They all propose to increase the sum total of human happiness. The manifestos of communism, nazism and democracy have much in common. Many people pick their leaders simply on the basis of their promises and on the basis of the zeal which they seem to manifest. Sometimes the very violence with which leaders would seek their ends seems a recommendation, as being a proof of zeal.

The Christian citizens will consider not only the social ends which are professed in words, but also those elements which, we have seen, make up the nature of change. They will inquire into whether the changes proposed will replace something imperfect by something better; will leave immune what cannot be improved and will avoid means which are evil. They have learned that the actual result will probably be determined more by the means than by the professions of long-range ends. Also, they know that a choice of violent means may not indicate honest zeal, but a lust for the increased power which comes to political leaders whenever violent means are sanctioned.

Difference of opinion about means is often the critical difference. Christians prefer means of the kind which, they believe,

Christ taught. They are not inclined to look with approval upon means of violence and coercion. They have seen that, over the ages, war, revolution and terrorism have been repeatedly invoked for noble ends. But change brought about in that way is hurried and it usually gets out of control. It crushes blindly what happens to lie in its path. At times it inspires fine and sacrificial qualities, but also it develops in men hatred of fellowman, vengefulness, hypocrisy, cruelty and disregard of truth. History seems to show that when these evil qualities are invoked to produce good ends, in fact they vitiate or postpone the professed ends. Change sought by methods of force, violence and coercion seldom produces lasting, good results. The Oxford Conference of 1937 said:

"Wars, the occasions of war, and all situations which conceal the fact of conflict under the guise of outward peace, are marks of a world to which the church is charged to proclaim the gospel of redemption. War involves compulsory enmity, diabolical outrage against human personality, and a wanton distortion of the truth. War is a particular demonstration of the power of sin in this world and a defiance of the righteousness of God as revealed in Jesus Christ and Him crucified. No justification of war must be allowed to conceal or minimize this fact."

Some Christians believe that the use of violence is of itself so un-Christian that it should never under any circumstances be resorted to. Most Christian citizens, it seems, do not accept that view. The vast majority appear to believe that while they ought not themselves to initiate the use of force as a means, once force is invoked by others to do injustice and to impose conditions violative of the moral law and of the Christian conception of the nature of man, then to use force to prevent those results may be the lesser of two evils. Christians would generally agree that methods of change other than violence are to be preferred because violence, unless it be the dispassionate force of police power under law, almost always generates un-Christian qualities which cancel out, or at least greatly dilute, the value of the changes which violence brings about.

If force is discarded as the accepted means of change, then there have to be established procedures and political organizations for the purpose of making peaceful change. Such procedures have, to a considerable extent, been established within states, but they are lacking in the international field. There, as elsewhere, history teaches the inevitability of change. If one

examines an historical Atlas and looks at the political arrangement of the world 100 years ago, 200 years ago and so forth, one cannot but be impressed by the magnitude of the changes that have occurred. Most of these changes have been effected by war or the threat of war. Each war brought about the disappearance of something that was imperfect. Often it involved the doing away of power in some men and nations which had become disproportionate to their ability or readiness to use that power for the general welfare. In that sense, the change was good. But, also, the method of violence has done terrible things to the hearts of men. It has not brought individuals to greater love of God and neighbor in accordance with the great Commandments. Indeed, the result has been, on the whole, quite the contrary. The prestige of Christianity in the world has been gravely impaired by the frequency with which the so-called Christian nations have used violence as a method of international change. Furthermore, the hatred, falsification, cruelty and injustice incident to each war have, we can see in retrospect, done much to provoke new war and all the evil that that entails.

### 3.

#### INSTITUTIONS FOR CHANGE REQUIRE DECIDING WHO CONTROLS.

Christian citizens can readily conclude, as a generalization, that there ought to be political institutions which will enable international change to take place in a peaceful way. But that conclusion is not, of itself, very significant. It cannot have any practical consequence unless also there is another decision, namely, whose judgment will determine the timing and the nature of peaceful change? Change *ought* to be based upon reflection and deliberate choice, not upon accident and force. Of course. But *whose* reflection and choice are to be controlling? That is a hard question. Within nations there is no uniform answer. In the international field few have attempted seriously to answer it and those few are not in agreement. Uncertainty, disagreement and competition about that largely explain why, in the international field, change has so far been left mostly to accident and violence.

It used to be widely held that political decisions should be made by rulers who were not responsible to their people. Today, it is generally agreed, at least in theory, that it is better that men should be self-governing through some representative process which they control. But that theory is seldom carried out in practice, even within nations. In many countries of the world, power is exercised by dictators. Of these, there are many types. Some are men who, loving power, have taken it and make no attempt to rationalize their action. Often, by written constitution, their government is a "republic" or "democracy". Some dictators are benevolent, taking power only to tide over a real or imagined crisis. Some exercise dictatorial power in order, professedly, to train the masses and discipline them into a common mold which, it is thought, ought to precede self-government. Such purposeful dictatorships are often termed "totalitarian".

There are other countries where the peoples do in fact, through representative processes, exercise a very large measure of influence upon the choices that are made as to change. These societies customarily describe themselves as "free societies". Some call them "responsible societies" or "self-disciplined societies". We use the phrase "free societies" because it has wider popular use, although we recognize, and hereafter emphasize, that there is interdependence between freedom and self-discipline and sense of responsibility. We also recognize that even in the so-called "free societies" there are usually some who are, in fact, excluded from equal opportunity to participate in the deliberative process which determines when and how change shall be effected.

In no country is there a "pure" democracy in the sense that all of the people have equal and direct participation in all of the deliberations which determine change. Also, in no country are dictatorships so absolute that those who possess the governmental power wholly disregard what they sense to be the wishes of the people. Even so, the organization of the different nations shows that there are great and momentous differences, both in theory and in practice, as to whose choice should determine change. These differences are a great obstacle to institutionalizing change at the international level. Therefore, the matter deserves further consideration.

FORMS OF GOVERNMENT  
COMPATIBLE WITH CHRISTIAN IDEALS.

Christians tend to favor the free society of self-discipline. That is probably because Christians think of man primarily in terms of the individual and his relations to God and to fellow-man. It is only individuals who have souls to be saved and God, it seems, is not concerned with nations, races and classes, *as such*. He is concerned with individual human beings. Christians, who believe that, want a political society which, recognizing the value and the sacredness of individual personality, gives the individual the opportunity to develop in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience and reason, and also puts on him a responsibility to exercise freedom with regard for the welfare of fellowmen.

Christians believe that for one man to possess arbitrary power over his fellowmen is an un-Christian relationship. It usually corrupts him who rules and it tends to debase those who are ruled, if in fact they acquiesce in being ruled.

Furthermore, Christians believe that civil laws, made by men, should, so far as possible, reflect the moral law. We believe that there is implanted in every individual a potential awareness of right and wrong and that under favoring conditions the composite of such individual judgments will reflect the moral law better than the judgments of absolute and self-perpetuating rulers. Also, as a practical matter, unless laws reflect and codify the moral judgments of those subject to them, they are not apt for long to be enforceable.

For such reasons, Christians tend to prefer the free society. But also they recognize that peaceful and selective change is not assured merely by giving people a right of suffrage. The voice of the people is not always the voice of God. It is easy to arouse masses for destruction without regard to the problem of replacement. Mob psychology is seldom conducive to selective change and it does not in fact represent individual reflection and choice.

A free society, if it is to effect peaceful and selective change, must be a society where, in addition to the right to vote, the

people possess and use personal freedoms and access to information and the opportunity to exchange and propagate thoughts and beliefs so that there is, on an individual basis, genuine reflection and sober choice of minds and spirits which are both free and developed by use and self-discipline. There is also need of tolerance, particularly in the sense that political power may not be used to promote any particular creed.

The free society may at times of emergency, such as the emergency created by war, grant one man or a few men very extraordinary, even dictatorial, powers. But the people will reserve effectively the opportunity to end these powers when the occasion for them has passed.

Economically, a free society does not have to be a "laissez faire" society. There are some who profess to believe that only a "laissez faire" society adequately encourages individual development. There are, however, few who today would put that belief wholly into practice. In all states, even those most dedicated to "free enterprise", there is governmental control of at least some of the tools of production, such as railroads and public utilities, which are endowed with a special public interest. In most countries, there are important collective and cooperative enterprises. It would seem that there is no inherent incompatibility between the Christian view of the nature of man and the practice of economic Communism or State Socialism. Communism, in the sense of "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs", was early Christian practice.

In the modern world, particularly where there is industrialization, there is much interdependence and necessity for cooperation. In part, this necessity can be met by individual knowledge of how, in a complicated society, individual acts affect others. To that knowledge there needs to be added self-control and sense of duty to fellowman, so that individuals will voluntarily refrain from acts which they see have injurious consequences more than offsetting the benefits to self. But even where the people are possessed of much self-control and sense of duty, there may have to be added public controls and centralized direction to promote the equitable distribution of goods in short supply and to insure cooperative and coordinated action on a scale adequate to the needs of our complicated economies.

One may have different judgments as to what economic structure is best adapted to modern conditions and as to the kind of incentive which is required to insure needed productivity. There are times and conditions when the most effective appeal is to self-interest. There are other times and conditions when the greatest appeal may be to men's sacrificial spirit. The Christian Church seeks constantly to make men's motives more lofty, and to invoke concern for others rather than for self. Christians believe that those that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please themselves. But there are few who fully heed that injunction. Christian citizens, in seeking to organize society, have to take account of what men *are*, not what the Church thinks they ought to be.

From the Christian viewpoint, the essential is political and economic conditions which will help, and not stifle, growth by the individual in wisdom and stature and in favor with God and man. We want conditions which, in so far as practical, will, in fact, exalt the dignity of man. The essential in this respect is the content, not the form. The conditions which best assure that will doubtless vary from time to time and from place to place.

It is not possible to attach the Christian label to any particular political or economic organization or system to the exclusion of all others. It is not possible to say that "free enterprise" is Christian and socialism un-Christian—or vice versa. It is not possible to say that a popular representative system of government is Christian, or temporary dictatorship inherently un-Christian. It is, however, possible to condemn as un-Christian societies which are organized in disregard of the Christian view of the nature of man. This would include those which are totalitarian in the sense that they recognize the right of some men to seek to bring the thoughts, beliefs and practices of others into conformity with their will, by processes of coercion.

It could be argued that if Christians really believe that the truth is uniquely revealed by God through Jesus Christ, they ought to seek an organization of the state which would make it possible to use every power, including police power, to compel acceptance of that truth and the liquidation of heretics and non-conformers.

There have been times when that viewpoint prevailed. Christianity, over its 2,000 years, has had many experiences and has learned much. It has learned that when Christians use political power, or any coercive or artificial means, to give special advantage to their distinctive sect, the outcome is apt to be an ugly thing. We reject methods which, history seems to teach, pervert Christianity. If we reject totalitarianism for ourselves, we, *a fortiori*, reject it for others. Believing that our own faith cannot remain pure when coupled with methods of intolerance, we also believe that no faith can enter into that partnership without corruption.

5.

PEACEFUL CHANGE IS POSSIBLE.

Practical experience seems to show that where the people have a considerable degree of self-discipline, where they recognize duty to fellowmen and where they have considerable education, then they can operate political processes which make for change which is peaceful and selective. In the western democracies, the political institutions have to a great extent been influenced by Christianity. (By Christianity we do not mean clericalism which may be an impediment to peaceful and selective change.) In these countries, conditions approximating those of a free society have on the whole existed for 150 years or more. During that period, social and economic change has been so immense that conditions in any one of these countries today would completely bewilder those who lived there 100 or 50 years ago.

The changes have, in the main, been peaceful changes. There has been little coercion, terrorism or civil war. The conspicuous apparent exception is the United States' war of 85 years ago, called in the North the "war of the Rebellion", but in the South the "war between the States". It was, in essence, more international than civil war. The basic issue was whether certain sovereign states had, by prior compact of union, given up the right to resume full sovereignty.

The social changes effected by free political processes have in the main tended to increase the opportunity of the individual to develop according to the dictates of his conscience and reason. Slavery has been abolished. There has been a definite trend away from treating laborers as animals or machines are treated.

Women have been freed from grave disabilities. Economically, individual initiative, experimental and competitive, has produced great richness. The "industrial revolution" while it has brought evils, has shown men how, with less physical effort, they can produce much more. Infant mortality has been greatly reduced, health generally improved, and the span of life lengthened. Education is general and the development of spiritual life has been kept free of political inhibitions. Graduated income taxes and death duties effect a very considerable distribution of production in accordance with need.

To say these things is not to be self-righteous or complacent. There are many great blots and many deficiencies. One notable blot is the persistence in the United States of a considerable, though diminishing, measure of race discrimination. There persist inequities of many kinds, economic, social and political. There is no assurance that ways have been found to prevent the cyclical breakdown of production process and the vast misery consequent thereon. By no means is God's will done as it is in heaven. To be satisfied would be un-Christian.

But it is not un-Christian to point out that where political institutions show evidence of Christian influence, the result is good fruit. If that were not so, one could doubt that Christianity did in fact reflect God's ultimate revelation to man. Christ said: "By their fruits ye shall know them" (Matt. 7:20).

It seems, both on the basis of theoretical reasoning and on the basis of practical experience, that peaceful and selective change can be assured under the conditions of a free society of self-discipline. There is no comparable evidence to show that under a despotic or totalitarian form of society, there can be sustained change that is peaceful and selective and which progressively increases the opportunities for individual growth.

## 6.

### WORLD SHORTAGE OF FREE SOCIETIES WITH TESTED POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

There are not in the world many societies which have tested political mechanisms whereby decisions reflect the choice and reflection of the people as a whole. That, in the main, is not

because such institutions are not wanted, but because various conditions have militated against their realization. Many peoples have been long in colonial dependency. Some, like the peoples of India and Pakistan and certain Arab states are only now moving from dependency to full independence. Some, like the peoples of China and Indonesia are in chaos and strife. Some, like the Germans, Japanese and Italians, are still under, or just emerging from, the military control of the victors. Some live under constitutions which, in words, vest sovereignty in the people; but they are, in fact, ruled by a small group which perpetuates itself in power by force, subject to change by periodic revolution. Some live under "dictatorships of the proletariat".

These facts are significant because they affect the practicability of developing internationally processes of change which will be peaceful and selective. It means that there do not exist, on a world-wide scale, tested institutions of political liberty and that there is an absence of the foundation needed for building a world structure which has political power to legislate change. The creation of a World State involves a mechanism of power and the selection of individuals to direct it. If the power is to be sufficient to make possible change which is adequate to replace violent change, there must, somewhere, be large discretionary authority. But it would not be possible today to assure that the discretion would come from peoples who were free, and morally and intellectually trained for the use of political freedom.

Theoretically, it is possible to devise a world representative system so "weighted" in favor of the societies of tested freedom that their representatives would have the preponderant voice. The others, who are the majority, would never consent to those few societies being accorded world supremacy. They would, in a sense, be justified. For while the free societies have shown good capacity to govern themselves, they have not shown the same good capacity to govern others, of different races and cultures. It would not advance us to recreate and extend the colonial system under the guise of "world government".

Today, any world-wide system for institutionalizing change would inevitably be despotic. Either it would vest arbitrary

power in the persons of a few individual officials, or it would vest great power in the small fraction of the human race who have tested political processes for reflecting the individual choice.

The great majority of the world's population will not, and should not, agree to be ruled by the "free societies". The "free societies" will not, and should not, go back under despotism.

This impasse is a source of great peril. It leaves international change to be effected largely by force and coercion. It does so at a time when the means for corrupting men's souls and destroying their bodies have grown far beyond anything that the world has ever known. Thus, Christian citizens can feel that each, according to his means, has a duty to act to increase the possibility of world political unity and processes for peaceful change. That does not mean that Christian citizens will treat unity as the all-sufficient end, to which they should sacrifice what to them seem justice, righteousness and human dignity. They will seek the conditions for unity with the urgency of those who know that great disaster impends and with the practicability of those who know that such disasters cannot be averted merely by the incantation of fine words.

## 7.

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREE SOCIETIES.

If peaceful change requires deciding whose judgment is to prevail, and if the judgment of a free, disciplined, society is the only reliable and generally acceptable judgment, then the extension of free societies throughout the world is prerequisite to a world-wide institutionalizing of change. Many Christian citizens see that as the great long-range political task. Its accomplishment would make it possible to set up and operate in a non-despotic way international mechanisms for peaceful change. That task has two aspects:

(a) It is first necessary to preserve and improve free societies where they now exist. Free societies are delicate plants. To grow them is a long, hard task and, once they are grown, they are in constant danger of withering away. The post-war climate has been particularly hard on free societies. The cumulative

result of two world wars is grave economic distress coupled with great human weariness and disillusionment. Under these conditions, men have a longing to be taken care of. Also, the economic margin for survival has been reduced to a point where centralized planning has seemed necessary. To men who are preoccupied with the struggle for the basic, material needs of life for their families, bread may be of more compelling and immediate importance than civil rights and freedom. Such conditions lead to giving great power to a few men.

Delegation of power does not, of itself, necessarily mean an abandonment of freedom. It may be an exercise of freedom to meet an emergency and the people may retain both the legal right and the practical political mechanisms for ending the delegation when the emergency has passed. As we have noted, free societies usually give dictatorial powers in time of great emergency, such as war, and it has been shown that they can withstand temporary dictatorship of this kind. Nevertheless, there is always grave risk in conferring dictatorial power because such power can readily become self-perpetuating.

To preserve the characteristics of a free society within the areas where it now measurably prevails will itself be a difficult task. It will require vigilance and dedication by Christians as citizens. That dedication should not be merely in the interest of *preservation*, but of *improvement*. Only effort motivated by the creative urge can generate the needed energy and enthusiasm. Struggles are seldom won merely by a defensive strategy.

(b) New free societies must be developed and this can be done and should be done rapidly wherever the necessary human foundation exists. Fortunately, much has been done, through varied channels, to create those foundations. The Christian churches have played, in this, a great part. The Christian missionary movement has had a great world-wide influence in developing in men a sense of duty to fellowman. Also, Christian schools and colleges have stimulated education throughout the world. On the moral and educational foundations developed over past generations, much is now being done to erect free political institutions.

Until recently, nearly one-third of the world's population were the subject peoples of the "free societies". Within the last

three years, free institutions have been set up in India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, the Philippine Islands and certain of the Arab states. A large measure of autonomy is envisaged for Indonesia. The total number of peoples thus acquiring political freedom represents about one-quarter of the population of the world and could more than double the total population of the free societies. That is an amazing and encouraging occurrence which should confound the pessimists and inspirit the disillusioned.

Of course, it is not certain that all of these new political entities will, in fact, maintain societies of freedom in the full sense. In part the present development represents a great experiment. In many of the areas momentous and difficult decisions remain to be made and there is not yet the kind and degree of individual moral and intellectual development which would easily assure a peaceful outcome. There will be need of sympathetic understanding, material aid, and scientific and technical assistance from the older societies of freedom.

There remain dependent colonial areas which can be developed toward self-government and free institutions. The colonial powers, by the United Nations Charter, have pledged themselves to seek that development, and to aid in attaining the result there has been created the Trusteeship Council.

It should be remembered in this connection that political wisdom generally comes only with practical experience. If people are to be held in guardianship until they have fully developed all the qualities desired, there will be an indefinite prolongation of guardianship. It is better to err on the side of giving freedom prematurely than to withhold it until there is demonstrated proof of ability to use it wisely. To learn by self-experience is apt to involve much suffering. But few learn adequately from the experience of others.

There is in China nearly one-fifth of the human race. Some Chinese leaders have, in recent years, sought to replace despotism with free political institutions. But progress has been slow. The people are materially impoverished and only a few have book-learning. They have had to undergo a war and occupation longer than that of the European continental allies. Individualism, in terms of the family, is perhaps excessive and a sense of community too restricted. But the people still possess richly the

qualities which will enable them to make a great addition to the foundations of political liberty.

During the last century there developed a sense of fellowship between the Chinese people and the peoples of the West, largely because of the activities of Christian missionaries, educators and doctors. Now, more than ever, such activities need to be continued and, indeed, intensified.

There is a great responsibility toward the vanquished peoples of Germany, Japan and Italy. The victors have made themselves the government of Germany; they, in fact, direct the government of Japan and will largely influence the post-war development of Italy. The peoples of these countries have education and personal morality in large measure. It ought to be possible for them to develop into free societies. That is a task of great difficulty because of the evil war has bred. But it is a task of unique importance.

A survey of the globe shows that it is possible for upwards of three-quarters of the human race to develop peacefully and quickly—say, within one or two generations—the use of free political institutions. No doubt there would be many inadequacies, as indeed there always are. But it is possible to foresee conditions under which there would be obtainable, from most of the peoples of the earth, judgments which reflect the thinking, on an individual basis, of minds and spirits which are free and developed by political experience and self-discipline. On that foundation it would be possible to establish, internationally, procedures for peaceful change which would not be despotic, but which would reflect that moral sense which, we believe, is potential in every human being.

The program suggested has a particular appeal to Christians because it is a peaceful program to which the Christian churches can make a great contribution. There can be parallel effort by the churches and Christian citizens.

The free society cannot be equated with a Christian society and it is possible to have free societies whose institutions are predominantly influenced by non-Christian religions. But the Christian faith especially emphasizes those qualities of self-control and love of neighbor which are needed for the

good operation of a free society. So, Christian citizens could feel that to extend free societies was a great long-range effort to which they could worthily dedicate themselves and seek to dedicate their nations. Thereby they would be laying the indispensable foundation for world institutions for peaceful and selective change. Those engaged in that effort could feel that they were making the world more nearly one where God's will would be done, and they would be responsive to the appeal of the masses that a way be found to save them and their children from the death, the misery, the starvation of body and soul which recurrent violence now wreaks upon man.

8.

CONFLICT OF PROGRAM WITH SOVIET PROGRAM.\*

The program which we suggest is one that, if vigorously espoused, could enlist great support throughout the world. In the countries to which we referred in the preceding section, both the people and their leaders predominantly want peaceful evolution as free societies. There are, of course, everywhere some who put their primary reliance upon means of violence but, in the countries referred to, even those do not dare openly to advocate force as an ideal method. In these countries there is freedom to citizens to advocate the use of political processes which are peaceful rather than violent. Our program would not, however, receive cooperation from the Soviet Communist Party and those in the world who are guided by, or subjected to, its dogma. The reason is not so much difference of opinion between Soviet and non-Soviet leaders as to the final ends to be sought, as difference of opinion as to the means by which those ends can be achieved.

The program we suggest is one for peaceful evolution toward conditions which will make possible the world-wide institutionalizing of change. The emphasis is on *peace*, both as end and means. The Soviet Communist Party does not believe in such peaceful evolution. It believes that only by violence and coercion can it secure its desired ends.

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\* Unless otherwise indicated, quotations are from J. Stalin's "Problems of Leninism", Moscow, 1940. This volume is currently circulated by official Soviet agencies as an authoritative expression of present day Soviet doctrine.

The difference about means creates a great gulf between Soviet practices and the practices of those not dominated by Soviet Communist philosophy. These differences in practice are especially important in the realm of international affairs and they cannot be ignored by those who, as citizens, have to take a stand on the international issues of our time. It makes it necessary to compare theory with theory and practice with practice and not to judge on the basis of comparing the theory of some with the practices of others.

The long-range social ends which Soviet leaders profess to seek are in many respects similar to such ends which Christian citizens seek. As a matter of political organization, Soviet doctrine does not look upon its "dictatorship of the proletariat" as the final best result. Such dictatorship is to be a preliminary phase which will gradually wither away in favor of a condition where the people are self-governing. Soviet dictatorship is "preparing the ground for the withering away of the state, which is one of the basic elements of the future stateless Communist society" (p. 38).

Economically, Soviet leaders seek "a much higher productivity of labor" (p. 295), "the abolition of exploitation of man by man" (Constitution, Article 4), and ultimately the distribution of the production of labor in accordance with the formula "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs" (p. 570).

Socially, Communist doctrine envisages the "equality of the rights of citizens of the USSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life" (Constitution, Article 123).

In its foreign policy, the Soviet Union is "the most internationalist of all state organizations" and seeks the amalgamation of all "into a single state union" (p. 37). It seeks for colonies the right "to complete secession" and "independent existence as states" (p. 51).

There is nothing in these long-term ends irreconcilable with what Christians seek. Indeed, most of those ends—and more—have been sought by Christians long before there was any Communist Party. Christians seek to develop in individuals

such a love of fellowman and such capacity for self-control and self-sacrifice as to reduce to a minimum the need for the State as a dictating authority. As we have noted, the early Christians "had all things common \* \* \* and parted them to all men, as every man had need" (Acts 2: 44, 45). Christians have long taught and sought the equal dignity and worth of the human personality without regard to race, nationality, color, class or sex. They have sought for colonial peoples self-government or independence as rapidly as circumstances might permit. Internationally, they have been the most ardent supporters of plans for world organization.

There is, we can see, much in common as regards ultimate social ends. But even as to these there is a difference in emphasis between Soviet and Christian thinking. Soviet thinking proceeds from a materialistic premise, whereas Christian thinking proceeds from a spiritual premise. Soviet leaders hold that "the material life of society \* \* \* is \* \* \* primary, and its spiritual life secondary", being merely a "reflection" of material life (p. 601). Christians believe that material and social conditions on earth are primarily important as creating the conditions needed for spiritual development. Christians believe in a moral law which derives from God and which establishes eternal standards of right and wrong. Soviet leaders do not believe in such concepts as "eternal justice" (p. 595).

These differences are important because they lead to the differences as to means. Where political institutions and practices reflect a materialistic philosophy, they readily subordinate the individual to some group, which may be nation, race or class. The individual who seems to get in the way of the chosen group may be treated ruthlessly and liquidated, or forced to conform, without such treatment involving a violation of any professed belief. It takes a spiritualistic approach to measure joy in terms of "one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons, which need no repentance" (Luke 15:7). To those who hold the materialistic philosophy of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin it seems permissible to treat the welfare of a particular class as the ultimate end and to use means which will promote that end irrespective of the effect of those means upon the dignity and sacredness of the individual human personality. Many of the long-term social ends professedly sought by Soviet

leadership are equally sought by Christian citizens, but the spiritual philosophy of Christianity requires rejecting means which can logically be accepted by those who have a materialistic philosophy.

Soviet leaders assert that the desired ends cannot be achieved peacefully and should not be sought peacefully. "Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one" (Karl Marx *Capital*). "Up to a certain period the development of the productive forces and the changes in the realm of the relations of production proceed spontaneously, independently of the will of men. But that is so only up to a certain moment, until the new and developing productive forces have reached a proper state of maturity. After the new productive forces have matured, the existing relations of production and their upholders—the ruling classes—become that 'insuperable' obstacle which can only be removed by the conscious action of the new classes, by the forcible acts of these classes, by revolution" (p. 617).

"Can such a radical transformation of the old bourgeois order be achieved without a violent revolution, without the dictatorship of the proletariat?

"Obviously not. To think that such a revolution can be carried out peacefully, within the framework of bourgeois democracy, which is adapted to the rule of the bourgeoisie, means that one has either gone out of one's mind and lost normal human understanding, or has grossly and openly repudiated the proletarian revolution" (p. 126).

This belief that the desired results are to be sought only by violence, not by peaceful evolution, is not just theory. It reflects itself in the whole structure of Soviet society, and in its policies, domestic and foreign.

Internally, there is the militaristic pattern that is typical of a state of war. Absolute power rests with the heads of the Soviet Communist Party, which functions as a wartime general staff. "The proletariat needs the Party first of all as its General Staff, which it must have for the successful seizure of power" (p. 79). The Soviet proletariat is considered as "the shock brigade of the world proletariat" (p. 538). The Party itself operates under "iron discipline". "The achievement and maintenance of the

dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and iron discipline. \* \* \* the parties of the Communist Internationale, which base their activities on the task of achieving and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, cannot afford to be 'liberal' or to permit freedom of factions. The Party represents unity of will, which precludes all factionalism and division of authority in the Party" (pp. 81, 82). This internal unity is achieved by periodic purges in the course of which it is necessary "to handle some of these comrades roughly. But that cannot be helped" (p. 542).

The Soviet State is one of the tools of the Party. "The Party exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, it exercises it not directly, but with the help of the trade unions, and through the Soviets and their ramifications \* \* \*. \* \* \* not a single important political or organizational question is decided by our Soviet and other mass organizations without guiding directions from the Party" (pp. 134, 135). The State, in turn, under such guiding direction from the Party, is a militant organization. "The State is a machine in the hands of the ruling class for suppressing the resistance of its class enemies. \* \* \* The dictatorship of the proletariat is the rule—unrestricted by law and based on force—of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie \* \* \*. The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be 'complete' democracy, democracy for all, for the rich as well as for the poor" (pp. 32, 33).

Under this form of organization, individuality is suppressed. In the field of politics and even of literature and the arts, there is coercion to think and act along uniform Party lines and there is coercion to eliminate any elements that might be discordant.

In its foreign policy, the Soviet Union shows its adherence to the theory that the ends which it seeks can only be achieved by violent means. As regards the colonial areas, it seeks independence through revolution rather than through peaceful evolution. This is perhaps the fundamental reason why the Soviet Union so long refused to sit upon the United Nations Trusteeship Council which is charged with promoting the peaceful evolution of dependent peoples toward independence or self-government. It prefers to seek "revolutionary alliance with the libera-

tion movement of the colonies and dependent countries" (p. 52). In non-colonial areas there is penetration, secret and open, designed to bring into key positions those who accept the iron discipline of the Party and, as conditions seem opportune, resort is had to such methods as political strikes, sabotage, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare. The Party has well-organized schools to train personnel for such tasks. These tactics have shown themselves in China, Korea, the Baltic States, Greece, Hungary, Bulgaria, Roumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, France, Italy and elsewhere. It is not suggested that whenever there is violence in any of these areas the Soviet is wholly responsible for it. In some of the areas internal conditions are of such a nature as themselves to be promotive of unrest. But the Soviet Communist Party openly encourages and seeks to exploit conditions of violence.

The Soviet Union is a member of the United Nations and that membership can be harmonized with the policies of the Soviet Communist Party. The first purpose of the United Nations is "to maintain international peace and security". That is an end to which the Party can subscribe because war is not a preferred method of the Party. The violence and coercion which it invokes are the violence and coercion of internal struggle, the struggle to get the "police power" and then to use it for liquidating the "class enemies". Wherever the processes of the United Nations seem to stand in the way of Soviet efforts to promote such violent effort, the Soviet Union stands aloof. It has boycotted most of the specialized agencies of the United Nations designed to promote peacefully the economic, social and cultural well-being of the members. It has boycotted the Commissions on Greece and Korea which are designed to maintain the integrity of these states as against revolutionary penetration from the Soviet Union or other states dominated by Communist Parties. It refused to sit on the "Little Assembly" as well as on the Trusteeship Council, which is designed to promote peacefully the evolution of colonial peoples to self-government or independence.

The Party doctrines to which we have referred are intensively taught to all Party members and are fanatically accepted. There is ample evidence to show that Soviet policy in fact reflects those doctrines and reflects the view that the changes desired cannot

be effected peacefully and that "a 'peaceful' path of development" is possible only "in the remote future, if the proletariat is victorious in the most important capitalist countries" (p. 35).

We also see that this dependence upon methods of violence brings with it much the same "compulsory enmity, diabolical outrages against the human personality, and a wanton distortion of the truth" which have led Christians to oppose "wars, the occasion of war, and all situations which conceal the fact of conflict under the guise of outward peace" (Oxford Conference, *supra*).

Since the formation of the Soviet Union there has been a constant effort to portray the Union as surrounded by vicious and rapacious enemies. "We must remember that we are surrounded by people, classes and governments who openly express their intense hatred for us. We must remember that we are at all times but a hair's breadth from every manner of invasion." (p. 157, Lenin). There has been constant effort to arouse hatred toward so-called "bourgeois" or "imperialist" peoples, and notably the British and Americans. "Let not our hatred of our foes grow cold" (Pravda, January, 1948). Normal social intercourse is looked upon as partaking of treason; intermarriage is forbidden.

It is taught that the nature of so-called imperialist or bourgeois countries is such that they must attack the Soviet Union and that "the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable" (p. 156, Lenin).

The militaristic regimentation within the Soviet Union involves many outrages against the human personality. These are reflected by frequent violent purges, by terrorism through secret police and by political concentration camps containing millions of persons.

Soviet propaganda by press and radio makes little effort to base itself on fact. It fabricates freely. Where facts are given, they are usually so given as to create an impression that is far from truth. That, of course, also happens elsewhere, but in a

free society there is opportunity to combat falsehood by challenge and contradiction.

Because the Soviet party relies on means of violence, coercion, hatred and falsehood, the good ends it seeks do not, in fact, arrive—as is usual under such circumstances.

At a time when individual political responsibility has been greatly increasing in the world generally, it has contracted within the Soviet zones of influence; and within the Soviet Union itself the leaders seem to contemplate indefinite postponement of that “withering away”, that “atrophy”, of dictatorship and that increase of individual self-rule which is one of the proclaimed ends (pp. 656-662).

At a time when economic inequalities have been levelling off in the capitalistic, free enterprise, countries, the Soviet state has found it necessary to reject the idea of “equalization” and “leveling the requirements and the individual lives of the members of society” (p. 521). Increasing reliance is placed upon the stimulus of individual reward and self-gain (p. 363). Marxism, it is now taught, “is an enemy of equalization” (p. 521). The workers get “payment for their work in accordance with its quantity and quality” and in accordance with the principle “he who does not work, neither shall he eat” (Constitution, Arts. 118, 12). There is indefinite postponement of the “higher phase” when there will be distribution “to each according to his needs” (pp. 569-570). Money, it is true, is not the primary means to power and special privilege. But other means are widely prevalent.

At a time when earnest and effective efforts are being made to achieve equality without regard to race or class, the Soviet party intensifies class warfare and its “classless” society is relegated to the indefinite future because, it is said, the struggle of the “new class” against the “bourgeoisie” is not a “fleeting period”, but an “entire historical era, replete with civil wars and external conflicts” (pp. 30, 31).

At a time when the Western democracies, notably Great Britain, were peacefully bringing political independence to upwards of 500,000,000 people, Soviet leaders, the great talkers about the right of peoples to “independent existence as states”

(p. 51), have not themselves produced any freedom for any people, but the Soviet Union has been annexationist.

At a time when the other great powers became increasingly disposed to increase the authority of the United Nations, Soviet leaders, while professing to seek a "single state union" (p. 37) have refused even to discuss moving toward that result by some diminution of the "veto" power within the Security Council.

It is not contended that Soviet communism is wholly bad. We have seen that all change has elements of good because everything that is is imperfect. Certainly, there was so much imperfection under the Czars that any change from that could readily work some improvement. Also, Soviet leaders do not rely wholly or continuously on means of violence and there have been some good, peaceful developments, notably in the field of education. Also, the very fact that there is a Soviet challenge has had a stimulating effect upon the Western democracies which, for their own good, needed the spur of competition.

Unfortunately, however, it seems basic in Soviet doctrine that there is now no "peaceful path of development". During the thirty years since the October Revolution, the emphasis, both in doctrine and in practice, has been on violent and coercive revolution, with results which confirm what history has so often taught, that good ends are not readily achieved by means of violence, terrorism, hatred and falsity such as the Soviet Party advocates and uses. Those who adopt these methods give an impression of great zeal and of great concern for their Cause. What they do attracts great attention just because it is violent, whereas peaceful change usually attracts little attention. But close analysis usually shows that when change is sought to be wrought by violence, the sense of progress, while exhilarating, is illusory.

So it is that while there is no irreconcilable conflict between the ultimate social ends which are professedly sought by Soviet communists and those ends which Christian citizens seek, there is great difference as to the means which should be used. That difference derives both from the different philosophical and moral premises and from conflicting judgments as to the kind of means that, in fact, can be relied on to produce the desired ends.

PEACEFUL RECONCILIATION OF PROGRAM  
WITH SOVIET PROGRAM.

The Soviet reliance on change by force and violence constitutes a serious obstacle athwart our suggested program. Soviet influence is considerable and it is now favored by external conditions. World War II created a vacuum of power in many areas. Of the eight so-called "great powers", three—Italy, Germany and Japan—have been engulfed by the disaster of defeat. Three—United Kingdom, France and China—have been enfeebled by the struggle for victory. Therefore, there is about the Soviet Union a power vacuum into which it has already moved to bring some 300 million people, representing about 15 nationalities, under the dominant influence of dictatorship of the proletariat and its revolutionary theories and practices.

Even more important than this fact of political vacuum is the fact that there has developed in the world much of a moral vacuum. The so-called western or Christian civilization has long accepted most of the social ends now professed by the Soviet Communist Party and, indeed, its goals have been even more advanced. But of recent years, it has seemed to be half-hearted and lacking in fervor or sense of urgency. The result has been that many people have unthinkingly compared the idealized purposes and theories of the Soviet program with the worst practices of western nations. Others, eager for quick results, uncritical of means, have been attracted to the Soviet program by the very violence of its means, which have seemed a proof of zeal. The fact that Christian citizens tend to favor non-violent means is taken as proof that they lack zeal. The consequent degree of following attracted by the Soviet dynamic program has encouraged Soviet leaders to entertain great expectations of realizing their particular "one world". Their ambitions have mounted so that there is indeed grave danger of that "series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states" which Lenin and Stalin have forecast as inevitable.

Christians must dedicate themselves to prevent such developments. There are in the main two ways of doing so.

First, Christians must reject, and see to it that their nations reject, the Soviet thesis of the inevitability of violent conflict and they must not imitate Soviet leadership by placing reliance on violent means.

Secondly, Christians must see to it that their nations demonstrate that peaceful methods can realize the goals which we all espouse.

There is disturbing evidence that the so-called "free societies" are themselves tending to adopt those features of Soviet procedure which Christians particularly condemn. In the United States, great emphasis is being placed upon achieving military supremacy and military counsels are more influential than has normally been the case in that republic. Some portions of the American press are stirring up emotional hatred against the Soviet Union and there is some distortion of truth, principally through the exaggeration of what is true but of minor importance.

It is no doubt desirable that the free societies should be resolute and strong. Also, it is important that the members of free societies should understand the true nature of the Soviet program so that they do not abet it mistakenly. Also, there is no good in concealing the fact that the Soviet program is dangerous. Whenever any particular group sets out to dominate the world and to do so by methods of violence, coercion and terrorism, a tense situation is bound to result. No doubt Soviet leaders do not want major war, although we must recall that Lenin has stated, and Stalin has repeated, that "if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to hold sway, it must prove its capacity to do so by military organization also" (p. 156, Lenin). But even if, as we believe, Soviet leaders now look upon their methods of internal penetration as more effective than international war, still the situation is risky. It requires a very nice judgment to use force precisely to the degree which will gain the maximum without precipitating actual war. Such an effort also assumes, on the part of others, a degree of self-control which we hope and pray exists, but which is not a certainty. Thus peace is at the risk of incidents or miscalculations. The free societies need to face up to that reality. But also they must strive to exercise iron self-control, being determined not themselves to use force to

crush the Soviet experiment. They may not like the Soviet experiment in state socialism and its dynamic world-wide program, but they must recognize that a free world is a world of difference and that any society has a right to experiment and compete. Marshal Stalin claimed that the results of the Soviet first Five Year Plan proved that "the working class is as able to build the new as to destroy the old" (p. 439) and that they have confounded the claim of capitalism as the "best of all societies" (p. 440). If in fact the Soviet system of State Socialism can peacefully confound capitalism, it is entitled to the opportunity to do so. Unhappily the Soviet does not rely primarily upon such methods of peaceful competition and comparison. But the Soviet methods, while they are in part methods which Christians will generally reject, are so far at least, methods short of war and Christian citizens of the free societies must make a supreme effort to do all that lies within their power to keep it so and to see that their nations use peaceful responses which are available and which can preserve and extend the system of free societies.

The most important response to the Soviet challenge will be in effecting peacefully the reforms which Soviet leaders contend can only be effected by violent means. We must by actual demonstration disprove Stalin's dictum that "one must be a revolutionary, not a reformist" (p. 597).

The western democracies won their prestige in the world through their great peaceful accomplishments. The industrial revolution, the concept of "liberty, equality and fraternity" and the experiments in political freedom created world-wide confidence in the dynamic and life-giving quality of their institutions. But for long now, these democracies have faced no serious competition. The quality of their effort has deteriorated and they have, to a considerable extent, been coasting with a momentum that is waning. Many do not like it that a challenge has now arisen. Many would prefer peace which is a condition of tranquility or stagnation, where all threat and challenge are removed and where men can feel that they can safely relax. Some are inclined to the view that unless we get that kind of peace, we do not have peace at all, and an irresponsible few talk of using force to crush the challenger. That is folly. Those of us who are of the western peoples face the task of mental adjustment to

a dynamic peace where there is competition. We need to make it clear to ourselves and we need to make it clear to proponents of other systems that we welcome a world in which there is peaceful competition. Above all, we need to make it clear that we can peacefully, through reform, bring about results which all men want and which they will be apt to seek by the violent methods which the Soviet sponsors unless we can prove that they can be achieved by peaceful means.

Whenever a system is challenged, there is a tendency to rally to support the system "as is". The world becomes divided between those who would maintain the *status quo* and those who would change the *status quo*. As we have seen, those who would sustain the *status quo* inevitably are defeated. And almost inevitably the issue is resolved by violence. The result may not be the particular changes desired by the dynamic powers, but equally, it does not maintain the status which their opponents sought to preserve. So it is that in the face of Soviet challenge we must not rally to the defense of our institutions just as they are, but we must seek even more ardently to make them better than what they now are.

In fact, much progress has been made along this line. We have already referred to the action of Great Britain in bringing about 500 millions of colonial dependent peoples peacefully to self-government. That has been the most effective way to demonstrate that the achievement of self-government by dependent peoples was not dependent upon a Soviet "revolutionary alliance" (p. 52) and that it is possible to achieve by peaceful means results which the Soviet leaders profess to want but which they have said could only be achieved by violent means.

The "free societies" have also made considerable progress in achieving an economy whereby production is on the basis of ability and distribution on the basis of need. The steeply graduated income and estate taxes which now prevail generally in "capitalistic" countries take largely from those who have ability to accumulate and to an increasing extent this is being distributed to those in need in the form of social security programs. These countries are in fact much closer to the so-called "higher phase" of communism than is the Soviet Union itself.

Socially, the great blot on the escutcheon of the democracies is the discrimination against colored persons practiced by much of the white population of the United States. Here, however, the problem is recognized and great efforts are being made to deal with it. It is not possible by legislative fiat to eradicate social prejudices, the origins of which go back hundreds of years. There is, however, a vast change which is in peaceful process.

The danger is that those who face the Soviet challenge will feel they must defend themselves on every count. There is some evidence that the Soviet challenge is, to an extent, having that natural result. Christians must stand strong against that, recognizing the imperfection of every system and of every nation, not identifying righteousness with anything that is, but constantly striving to prove that the evils that exist can be eradicated by peaceful means.

That demonstration is already gathering momentum, and as that momentum grows, the Soviet menace will become innocuous and Soviet leaders themselves will probably abandon, or at least indefinitely postpone, their efforts to produce change by violent means. Probably they will not do so as a matter of conviction, for the conception of violent change is deeply ingrained. But they can be expected to alter their tactics as soon as there will no longer be available to them in the different countries of the world sufficient support for successful revolutionary measures. Soviet leaders are realists. They do not consider that violence must be continuous or that it should be recklessly undertaken. Their aim is to strike "at the decisive point, at the decisive moment" (p. 63, Lenin). There is not uninterrupted attack and there may at times be strategic retreat. "They have to realize—and the revolutionary class is taught to realize by its own bitter experience—that victory is impossible unless they have learned both how to attack and how to retreat properly." (p. 65, Lenin) "The object of this strategy is to gain time" (p. 65). There must be a "selection of the moment for the decisive blow" (p. 64).

So it is that while Soviet leaders believe in violent means, they do not believe in continuing violence and they do not believe in violence being precipitated until the moment comes when "all

the class forces hostile to us have \* \* \* exposed \* \* \* their practical bankruptcy" (p. 64, Lenin).

The years between the Soviet revolution and World War II involved a very large exposure of practical bankruptcy on the part of non-Communist nations. During that period the "free societies", at least, were not at their best. Soviet leaders have encountered weaknesses which have afforded them great opportunities and given them great encouragement. Within recent years that situation has begun to change. There have been some great constructive developments. To some of these we have alluded. It is possible to push forward along these lines and it is imperative that this should be done.

It is regrettable that the Soviet Communist Party and those that follow its guiding directions will not cooperate in a world program to develop peacefully conditions needed for peaceful change. But that non-cooperation need not operate as a veto. If, through fear or morbid fascination, the free societies do nothing, then they do indeed make inevitable those violent revolutionary processes, those frightful collisions, which Soviet leadership would precipitate as its means to its ends.

The Soviet challenge loses its potency once the free societies show a capacity for constructive action. As we have said, the challenge, in its present phase, seems not a militaristic challenge, like that of Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese war lords. It is a call to revolution. If the non-communist societies, faced by that challenge, stand still and do nothing, for fear of offending Soviet leadership, they are lost. If they quietly move ahead, showing a practical capacity to achieve peacefully the things which Soviet leaders say can come only after an "entire historical era" of violence, then those talkers will quickly be rated as "incorrigible windbags"—to use Stalin's expression (p. 533).

It is important that there be these peaceful developments both domestically and internationally. We have already outlined what might be the grand, over-all, international program. But such a long-range program is not enough to meet the present need because it does not contain enough possibility to register quickly decisive results and thus to create general recognition of the capacity of the free societies. Intermediate programs are needed, where successes can be registered, prestige gained and

momentum acquired. We shall go on to consider what might be some of these intermediate programs.

## 10.

### INTERMEDIATE STEPS PRESENTLY PRACTICABLE.

It is not necessary to stand still and do nothing internationally until there has been laid the world-wide foundation for a free world society. There is much which can be done, today and tomorrow. There are already two great assets with which to work. One is the great and all-pervading force of the moral law. A second is the existence of an organization—the United Nations—which brings together in public association most of the nations of the world. On the basis of these two facts, many intermediate successes can be achieved.

#### *Exposure to Moral Judgment.*

The moral law has universal influence. There are some who deny its existence and who try to educate men to ignore it. It is never immediately and universally effective. But still there is general, world-wide agreement about "right" and "wrong" in their broad outlines. That fact is of immense importance, for it makes it possible to use moral force for peace and justice at a time when there cannot yet be an adequate political mechanism.

Moral power can be a powerful force in the world. That is not a mere pious hope. It is the judgment of every realist throughout history. It was Napoleon who said that "in war, moral considerations make up three-fourths of the game". It was Admiral Mahan who said that physical force was useful only "to give moral ideas time to take root".

Allied leaders during both the First and Second World Wars did much to consolidate and marshal world sentiment to insure Germany's defeat. They did that through great statements of aims, such as the Fourteen Points and the Atlantic Charter, which appealed to the moral conscience of the world. It is possible also to frame issues and organize moral power in the interest of peace.

The United Nations is a political machine which even now can be used to make moral power work during peace to preserve peace. That is largely due to Christian influence.

Many thought that world organization should be primarily a military organization to carry out the will of the great powers. That was, indeed, the conception which dominated the representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States when they met at Dumbarton Oaks in the summer of 1944 to make a first draft of the Charter. But our church people did not think much of an organization which would be primarily military and which would depend chiefly on physical force. So they worked hard to make their point of view prevail. It did largely prevail at the San Francisco Conference of 1945, thanks in great part to the small nations, which did not want to be placed permanently under the military dictatorship of the three big powers.

So, the San Francisco Conference radically changed the plan of Dumbarton Oaks. It emphasized the United Nations General Assembly as a place where the representatives of all states, big and little, would meet and discuss any problems of international relations, and where even the great nations could be required to subject their conduct to the judgment of world opinion.

The United Nations has now been functioning for over two years. Many are disappointed with the results. They would like the United Nations to be able to dictate and enforce the particular results which they want. As we have seen, the United Nations cannot now be that kind of an organization. However, it has revealed great possibilities. Of course, it has not settled everything. Indeed, the international situation is gravely troubled. But the United Nations has shown that it need not be a mere spectator. It can do something. It can call every nation's international acts to the bar of public opinion, with confidence that that will have healthy practical consequences.

We have seen how, in time of war, the public verdict of right and wrong exercises a powerful effect. The United Nations has begun to show how, in time of peace, public opinion can exercise a powerful effect. At the San Francisco Conference

and at the subsequent Assemblies of the United Nations political leaders from many lands have presented views on many matters. Always the speakers were obviously conscious of the fact that their audience included the representatives of many million people who possessed great power and who were primarily swayed by moral considerations. Every speaker presented his case with regard to what he thought was world opinion and he tried to get its backing. Almost always the different governments presented their positions otherwise than they would have done had they been meeting in secret and not subject to informed world opinion. That is a fact of great moment. It does not make future war impossible. It can make war less likely.

Things equal to the same thing are equal to each other. If world opinion can bring the foreign policies of the different nations toward harmony with the world's moral judgment, then those policies will automatically move toward harmony with each other.

It ought to be normal that major international policies which create fear or resentment anywhere should be subjected to the scrutiny of the Assembly.

The United Nations Charter provides that the Assembly may discuss any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair friendly relations among nations. Thus, the Assembly can act as the "town meeting of the world", as was the design. If any nation is afraid to have its international policies discussed, that is good proof that they ought to be discussed. In the Assembly the sponsors of questioned policies would explain them and welcome an expression of the confidence of the Assembly. The verdict would not have any legal consequences. There may not be immediate and clear-cut compliance with it, but an unfavorable judgment would to some degree influence the future of the condemned policy and make more likely its modification or abandonment. No nation, however strong, will lightly defy a verdict which seems to reflect the informed and aroused moral judgment of mankind.

Soviet dictatorship is sensitive to public opinion. It is by no means stupid enough to think that it can prevail merely by force. At home it can, within limits, make public opinion what it will. But only within limits. The Party recognizes that it must

"properly express what the people are conscious of" and that this is a "necessary condition" (p. 152). Stalin says that the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations in 1934 because it recognized that the possibility of exposure would deter wrongdoers. "\* \* \* despite its weakness the League might nevertheless serve as a place where aggressors can be exposed" (p. 628). The Soviet representatives, more than any others, have used the United Nations as a forum for appealing to public opinion. They recognize that, in the outer world, where police power and control of news are not at their command, Soviet foreign policy cannot prevail unless it can bring people generally to believe in its rightness.

So, while the United Nations cannot today be converted into a mechanism directed by a few persons having power to rule the nations, it can be used to subject national acts to the test of moral judgment. Moral power arises from the most humble to reach the most mighty. It works inexorably, even though slowly. It will not suit the impatient. But it can achieve solid results. The important thing is that the United Nations be used for purposes for which it is adapted and not be discredited by attempted use for purposes for which it is ill adapted.

Some relatively minor changes would serve greatly to increase the capacity of the United Nations to serve as a medium for focusing world opinion upon national acts. There should be a permanent organ of the United Nations able, at all times, quickly to bring to light the facts necessary for world opinion to form an intelligent judgment. The Security Council logically should do that. But its freedom to investigate is limited by the Permanent Members' right of veto. If this cannot be changed, then it may be that the General Assembly could undertake this task, perhaps through its "Interim Committee" or "Little Assembly" so as to assure at least what Stalin referred to as "exposure".

#### *Social and Economic Agencies.*

The United Nations is not designed merely to deal with political problems. It is also designed to promote human welfare. One of the great conceptions embodied in the Charter was that the unity gained in war could be preserved in peace if the war allies went on together to combat the social, economic and physi-

cal enemies of mankind. So the Charter branded intolerance, repression, injustice, disease and economic want as the common enemies of the morrow, just as Nazi Germany and Imperialist Japan were the common enemies of the day. It proposed that the United Nations stay united to wage war against these evils.

These possibilities of the United Nations have not, as yet, been adequately developed. Commissions and specialized agencies are at work, but they have not yet had time to achieve any dramatic successes and, indeed, their work has largely been lost sight of because political controversy in the Assembly and Security Council has seemed more exciting, more news-worthy and more important. The economic and social tasks of the United Nations should be brought into proper perspective and pushed with effort comparable to that invested in the political phase of United Nations work.

#### *International Bill of Rights.*

One of the most important of these social tasks of the United Nations is the bringing into force of an agreed international Bill of Rights. The United Nations Charter itself, by its preamble, affirms faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person. One of its basic purposes is to achieve international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all. Provision is made in the Charter for a commission for the promotion of human rights, which Commission has now been established. It ought to be possible through this Commission to bring about increased acceptance of a Bill of Rights. This, if done, would greatly facilitate the building of the foundation required for transforming the United Nations itself into a more effective political instrumentality. This important subject is being dealt with in another Paper.

#### *Functional Agencies.*

A further important area of usefulness lies in the development of functional agencies to carry out agreed policies. The United Nations itself, under present conditions, cannot legislate generally. There are, however, some matters as to which a policy could be voluntarily agreed upon between all or most of the member states. Then these agreed policies could be entrusted to

some functional agency to carry out. One of the proposals regarding atomic energy illustrates this type of procedure. The fact that that particular proposal has not yet been accepted, does not show that the functional approach is itself unsuitable. The functional approach is the easiest and most painless method of breaking down, or at least breaking through, national boundaries. It does not involve any blanket delegation of power which could be used despotically. It is merely a means of achieving, on an international basis, a concrete result sought by different nations.

In the United States, the State of New York and the State of New Jersey have, through a treaty, consented to by the Federal Congress, created the Port of New York Authority, which develops the sea and air facilities of the New York Harbor area. It finances its own projects. It serves an end which is greatly in the interest of the people of both states and it does so by means and methods which are so inconspicuous that few citizens of either state are aware of the fact that they have made a very large surrender of sovereignty to an inter-state body.

Functional agencies, to advance mutually desired ends, can be set up under the auspices of the United Nations in agreement with the member states or such of them as are concerned. The operations of the agencies within the agreed scope of their authority, could be free of any veto power.

It is particularly important that atomic energy should be brought under world rule. There exists a moral basis for such rule because all of the governments have expressed the view that there should be effective means to assure that this new power should be used constructively for man's welfare and not destructively for, perhaps, the extermination of mankind. The United Nations Assembly, as its first important act, voted unanimously to establish a commission to accomplish this result. However, nearly two and a half years have since elapsed and differences as to the means of control have created an impasse. Meanwhile, the knowledge of how to use atomic energy for destruction is doubtless growing and competent persons say that the monopoly of know-how may be broken in the near future. A situation of great gravity would arise if, behind the present ideological differences, there lay the menace of atomic weapons. It would

be particularly grave if these weapons were held by persons who espouse the use of violent means to achieve their ends. Civilization is drifting dangerously toward the edge of an awful precipice. To save it may require that atomic energy should on a world-wide basis be promptly brought under international control.

### *Regional Agencies.*

The United Nations Charter provides for regional agencies and agencies for collective self-defense. Through such agencies, international organization can be developed more rapidly than on a world-wide scale. Inevitably, world-wide development is the slowest; local development is quicker. Political institutions have developed from cities and principalities to counties and states and, finally to great aggregation of states, like the Soviet Union and the United States, bound together by a federal system, and the British Commonwealth, bound together by loose agreement and common loyalties which have become traditional. The Pan American defense system is a striking illustration of how groups of nations may unite on the basis of common interest and common trust.

Steps toward political, economic and monetary unity are being taken by many nations of Europe. This is a good development. Europe divided into a score or more of separate unconnected sovereignties can never again be a healthful and peaceful part of the world. To substitute unity and strength for disunity and weakness is precisely the kind of positive action of which the free societies must prove themselves capable.

It is axiomatic that world government is the last step and the most difficult step to take. It is easier to develop political mechanisms on a less than universal basis than on a universal basis. By doing that, men can increase somewhat the possibilities of peaceful and selective change on an international basis. If, for example, ten nations can find a common political mechanism, they should not be prevented from doing so merely because sixty nations cannot do the same thing. It would be as logical to say that the states of the Soviet Union or of the United States should not have come together politically because that unity could not be achieved on a world-wide basis. Regional

pacts and arrangements for collective self-defense are expressly authorized by the Charter of the United Nations (Articles 51, 52). They should be encouraged, subject only to the qualification that they should be genuinely based upon legitimate common interests; should in no sense be a military alliance directed against any other state; should sincerely seek to maintain and promote universality through the United Nations. Today there are in the world a series of international groupings. There is the Soviet Union and its several associated states. There is the British Commonwealth. There is the Arab League. There is the Pan American system. Such groupings can be steps toward the universal world order which is the goal of our long-range program.

We could go on indefinitely in this vein. We have, however, said enough to indicate that, with a moral law of universal scope and with the United Nations as a place to bring together national acts and world-wide judgments, important intermediate results can be achieved. There is much to be done on a less than universal basis, within the framework of the Charter. Nations and peoples can do much to help each other. Such efforts do not take the place of our long-range program, because they do not constitute a conscious, planned effort to create, on a world-wide basis, the conditions prerequisite to a general institutionalizing of change. But interim measures can gain the time and the prestige needed for successful development of a long-range program.

What seems urgent—and possible—is to revive in men a sense of moving peacefully toward a state of greater perfection. Many have been beaten and broken in spirit by the violence of the forces that have been loose in the world for now upward of a decade. They temporarily placed hope—perhaps undue hope—in the United Nations. But that hope has largely gone and there is despairing acceptance of the idea that continuing violence is inevitable for an entire historical era.

That is a dangerous mood. It can, perhaps, be broken by acts which, even in a small way, show the possibility of peaceful change. Let us, therefore, not despise what is presently possible, knowing that out of small things can come a rebirth of faith and hope, and that out of faith and hope can come great things, far beyond any that are here portrayed.

## CONCLUSION.

*The Role of the Christian Church.*

Many will feel that the programs here outlined are quite inadequate; and those who feel that way may be quite right. Certainly our suggestions seem unimaginative and stodgy in comparison with many programs, particularly the Soviet program for achieving its ideal single world state by means of world-wide proletarian revolution. We have tried to write under a self-imposed ordinance, namely, to propose only what we felt might *practically* be achieved by *peaceful* means and without the sacrifice of hard-won human rights. No doubt, even within this limitation, there are better prospects than are here portrayed. But no program which is both practical and peaceful will seem as exciting and dramatic as a program which is purely imaginative or violent.

Leaders who invoke violence attract a fanatical following because they seem to know what they want and to be determined to get it. They give an impression of being right just because they seem willing to risk much to achieve their goals. Many seem to feel that "truth" is whatever people are willing to fight and die for, and that unless people advocate killing and dying, they must be doubtful in their own minds. So it is that ways of violence often become exalted and ways of peace are often depreciated.

It would be easy to arouse the so-called "free societies" of the Western "Christian" civilization to initiate a great crusade, a holy war. Their program could be expressed in many fine sounding slogans, such as the "smashing of atheistic despotism" and the "removal of the last remaining obstacle to indispensable world government". Such a program would evoke great enthusiasm and many fine sacrificial qualities. Many would gladly fight and die for such ends.

We reject any such procedure because of our profound conviction that its violence would end in utter frustration. We

consider that such a procedure would be as irreconcilable with Christianity as is the violent procedure which Soviet leaders advocate and that in either case the procedure would produce results quite different from those sought.

We are fully conscious of the fact that peaceful and practical programs will seem to many to evidence a lack of zeal and to conceal a desire selfishly to preserve the evils of the *status quo*. That appraisal, in our opinion, can be and should be changed. Christians should, we believe, appraise more highly than they seem to do the self-control, the self-discipline and the respect for human dignity required to make change peaceful. The Christian churches could, we think, find the way to make peaceful efforts seem more inspirational and be more sacrificial. It is a tragedy that inspiration and sacrifice in large volume, seem to be evoked only by ways of violence. If the Christian churches could change that, then, indeed, they would help the Christian citizen along his way.

We have not outlined tasks which could be participated in only by Christians because we believe that if Christians advance a political program which only Christians can support, they logically must contemplate a monopoly of power and privilege on behalf of their particular sect. That, we have made clear, would, in our opinion, vitiate the program. But the task which we have outlined is a task which should arouse the Christian churches to a sense of special responsibility.

What is the need? The need is for men and women who can see what now is and what can be. Christ put particular emphasis on vision and light. He taught men to see truly and to avoid the hatred, hypocrisy and selfishness which blind men or warp their visions. If Christian churches do not produce the needed vision, what can we expect but that mankind will stumble.

The need is for men who have the peacefulness which comes to those who are possessed by the Christian spirit of love; who have the power which comes to those who pray, repent and are transformed and who have the dedication of those who leave all to follow Him.

The need is for more effective political use of moral power. The moral law, happily, is a universal law. But Christians believe that, through Christ, the moral law has been revealed with unique clarity. The Christian churches ought, therefore, to be especially qualified to help men to form moral judgments which are discerning and to focus them at the time and place where they can be effective.

The need is for full use of the present great possibilities of the United Nations. It was Christians most of all who wanted a world organization which would depend primarily on moral, rather than physical, power. They have it. Now it is up to the churches to generate the moral power required to make the organization work.

The need is to build the foundation for a more adequate world organization. A world of free societies could be that foundation, and free society depends, in turn, on individuals who exemplify Christian qualities of self-control and of human brotherhood, and who treat freedom not as license, but as occasion for voluntary cooperation for the common good. So, again, the Christian churches have the great responsibility.

The need is for effort on a world-wide scale. The Christian Church is a world-wide institution. Consequently, the individual Christian may exert his influence not only as a citizen but also as member of a church which in its corporate life has a contribution to make. The Church demonstrates in its own life the achievement of community out of various races, nationalities and communions. It develops a common ethos. Its missionary movement constantly extends the fellowship of those who share the same loyalties and purposes. Its ecumenical movement deepens and consolidates that fellowship. Its program of relief and reconstruction restores hope to the despairing and reconciles those who have been enemies. The Commission of the Churches on International Affairs is beginning to give stimulus and leadership to the more direct impact of the churches on the current problems of relations between the nations. Thus the churches themselves in many ways can help build the bases for world order.

So it is that, as we analyze the need, Christian responsibility emerges as an inescapable fact. It is a fact that ought to have practical consequences. The potentialities of Christian influence are great, but the present weight of Christian impact is wholly inadequate. If, in the international field, Christians are to play their clearly indicated part, their churches must have better organization, more unity of action and put more emphasis on Christianity as a world religion. That, we pray, will come from the Amsterdam Assembly and the final realization of the World Council of Churches.

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